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The ability to secure industrial control systems (ICS) against adver-
saries relies on defense in depth and implementation of security
controls. However, as automation and networking of industrial pro-
cesses increases, so do the opportunities for adversaries to cause
destruction and disruption. Many industrial firewalls are propri-
etary and often users blindly trust that the firewalls meet vendor
security claims. Independent testing can assess these claims. This
paper describes the security testing of two commercial ICS firewalls
to determine whether or not these firewalls provide protection of
resources as advertised. Our test philosophy is guided by the Flaw
Hypothesis Methodology (FHM)—a penetration testing technique
for discovery of security flaws derived from documentation and
other evidence. The test coverage includes functional testing, ex-
ception testing, and penetration testing. Testing is conducted on
a simulated natural gas compressor system, utilizing two open-
source vulnerability analysis tools, Nessus and Metasploit. The
testing methodology is the first step toward a general approach for
selecting and testing firewalls intended for critical control systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) integrate physical devices, net-
works, and controllers to automate industrial processes. These pro-
cesses include gas and oil refineries, power generation, water and
waste systems, etc. As the automation and networking of industrial
processes increases, so does their vulnerability to cyber attack.
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After the power grid attack in Kiev, Ukraine in 2016, the US-
CERT published the CrashOverride Malware security alert TA17-
163A [22]. It discussed a defense-in-depth strategy that includes
protection techniques such as white-listing, patch management,
and authentication controls. Industrial firewalls play a major role
in the defense-in-depth approach. However, to be effective, these
firewalls must be properly configured to disallow unnecessary, and
potentially disruptive, communications on the ICS network.
In early 2019, a firewall-related attack on the U.S. power grid was
acknowledged by the North American Electric Reliability Corpora-
tion (NERC), the U.S. grid regulator, in a “lesson learned” report [5].
This attack exploited a vulnerability in the firmware of internet-
facing firewalls that controlled traffic between a control center and
multiple remote power plants, and in the firmware of the firewalls
used between field equipment in those remote sites. The vulner-
ability allowed the attacker to force the firewalls to continuously
reboot over a ten-hour period, resulting in repeated loss of commu-
nications between the control center and the affected sites [5].
Since proper firewall selection and configuration are paramount,
the motivation for this work is to validate the following hypothesis:
ICS firewalls do not always provide the functionality advertised by
the vendor, and are susceptible to exploits that can be launched uti-
lizing open source software. Testing of our hypothesis is conducted
using two commercial ICS firewalls: Tofino SA and Tofino Xenon.
The analysis focuses on vendor claims regarding the security and
functionality that these two products provide. We used open-source
penetration testing tools (Metasploit and Nessus) to scan and ex-
ploit potential weakness in these two firewalls, as they operated in
different phases: discovery, configuration, and operational.
The contribution of this work is a demonstration of a repeatable
testing methodology for ICS firewalls guided by the Flaw Hypothe-
sis Methodology [24]. The testing methodology is framed around
functional testing, exception testing, and penetration testing. These
tests are used to verify vendor claims, test firewall-supported pro-
tocols, and examine deep packet inspection module functionality.
Our testing procedures help to identify shortfalls in the security
provided by the subject ICS firewall. Such testing increases confi-
dence in the protection of ICS systems essential to the operation of
critical infrastructures.
In the remainder of the paper, we first provide basic information
on ICS architectures and industrial network protocols and discuss
prior work in §2. In §3, we describe the two firewall systems under
test (SUT), including a discussion of their functional characteristics,
self-protection features, and known vulnerabilities. We present
our testing philosophy in §4. We discuss the test plan and testing
environment and explain the test results in §5 and §6, respectively.
Finally, we present our conclusions and future work in §7.
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2 BACKGROUND
A common ICS system is a supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion (SCADA) network used in many industries for the purpose of
controlling and monitoring cyber-physical systems. While specific
SCADA topologies vary, most SCADA networks share a basic orga-
nization: 1) one or more human machine interface (HMI) machines
to manage and monitor the control process, 2) one or more network
servers (e.g., asset management servers and data historians), and
3) control loops consisting of devices such as programmable logic
controllers (PLC), sensors, actuators and end devices.
2.1 Network Protocols
The protocols we tested are Modbus, Common Industrial Protocol
(CIP), EtherNet/IP, and Remote Method Invocation (RMI).
Modbus is an industrial protocol, which was originally developed
to communicate with PLCs over a serial interface [10]. Modbus-TCP,
a more modern application of the original Modbus protocol, rides
over TCP/IP networks. Modbus employs amaster-slave architecture,
with one master and up to 247 slaves, where only the master can
query. The protocol is simple, consisting of an address, function
code, data, and error check.
CIP follows a producer/consumer model as opposed to a tradi-
tional source/destination model. The producer is a device, such
as a Human Machine Interface (HMI), that transmits messages to
be used by one or more consumers, such as PLCs. CIP supports
two message types: explicit messages and implicit (I/O) messages.
Explicit messages are used to request a service from a device, such
as read or write. Implicit (I/O) messages are used to transport time-
critical information, such as an instruction commanding a PLC to
increase pump speed [16].
EtherNet/IP allows CIP devices to communicate over Ethernet,
by placing the CIP message inside a TCP or UDP packet [17].
RemoteMethod Invocation (RMI) is a Java-based protocol, similar
to Remote Procedure Call (RPC), and allows distributed objects
across a network to be written to. The Xenon firewall uses this
protocol to pass configuration objects across the network to the
firewall, allowing it to modify its existing configuration.
2.2 Related Work
Firewall testing approaches vary widely, ranging from ad-hoc test-
ing of policy rules to formal modeling. Brucker et al. [3] discuss a
formal model of both stateless and stateful firewalls and a verifica-
tion approach for conformance testing of network policies. Jurgens
and Wimmel [8] describe a specification-based testing approach
in which test sequences are automatically derived from the formal
specification of a firewall system. To test the correctness of firewall
policies, Hwang et al. [7] argues that structural coverage testing,
i.e., testing specific firewall policy elements based on their rules,
predicates, etc., is more effective than exhaustive testing. Al-Shaer
et al. also proposes a sampling-based testing framework that seg-
ments the traffic space to minimize the test traffic required to check
all possible decision paths for a given firewall policy.
Ranum [18] discussed two firewall testing approaches: “checklist”
and “designed-oriented”. The former only requires running vulner-
ability scanning tools against the firewall, whereas the latter is
much more difficult because it requires interviewing the firewall’s
developers to formulate a set of tests to validate the properties
claimed by the developers. Our work draws from both of these
approaches. Since direct access to Tofino engineers is not possible,
we use vendor manuals to derive the claimed properties.
The Flaw Hypothesis Methodology (FHM) was introduced by
Weissman as a way to conduct systematic penetration testing [24].
Its objective is not to demonstrate ways to exploit the system under
test, but rather to reveal counter examples to assertions of truth
about the system that may be provided by various forms of evidence:
manuals, documentation, design documents, verification evidence,
etc. [25]. The FHM is intended for use in several types of testing:
whitebox, graybox, and blackbox. In the past, the FHM was applied
to operating system penetration, often with the cooperation of the
product vendor, e.g., [9]. In this work we use the FHM as a guideline
for blackbox testing of an ICS firewall.
3 FIREWALLS UNDER TEST
The firewalls tested, Tofino Security Applicance 9211-ET and Tofino
Xenon, are application firewalls (Fig. 1) able to perform deep packet
inspection on protocols such as EtherNet/IP, CIP, and Modbus.
Figure 1: Tofino SA (left) and Tofino Xenon (right)
They also are capable of identifying sequences of commands,
such as repeatedly generated SYN packets in a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack [6] [21]. This is important because control systems
rely heavily on timing. For example, in certain situations, shutting
off a fill tank before it overfills another tank or container is crucial
and must be accomplished in a timely manner.
For the initial phase of our project, we chose to use these firewalls
and the simulated test environment (described in §5.3) because they
were sufficient to test our strategy. They were also readily available
when the project started.
3.1 Tofino Security Appliance (SA)
The Tofino Security Appliance 9211-ET consists of a hardware base
and the following software: Tofino Central Management Platform
(CMP), Secure Asset Management Loadable Security Module (LSM),
Firewall LSM, Event Logger LSM, and Modbus TCP Enforcer LSM.
3.1.1 Management Interface. The Tofino CMP software provides
the user interface used to manage the SA. The CMP console display
information about the network topology, active SAs and assets (e.g.,
HMI and PLC), and alerts generated by the firewall LSM.
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3.1.2 Device Discovery. There are two types of device discovery:
SA discovery and asset discovery.
SA discovery. This operation identifies SAs connected to the net-
work. The CMP user starts it by specifying a range of IP addresses
and initiating a scan for a range of IP addresses. Being a firewall, the
SA does not have its own IP address; it borrows an IP address from
the protected network that is recognized by the CMP. A continuous
scan continuously scans the designated IP address range (one IP
address at a time) until the user directs it to stop. If the SAs are
already connected to the network, a single scan of the specified
address range will transmit an ARP request for each IP address
once, and then stop.
SAs operate in several modes. An SA is in the Predeployed mode
immediately following a factory reset. While in this mode, the SA
is not configured and has not been paired to the CMP. Passive mode
is the only accessible mode from the Predeployed mode. In Passive
mode, the SA allows all traffic to pass unexamined and will remain
in this mode until the CMP user directs a mode change to Test
mode. While in Passive or Test mode, the LSMs can be activated
and configured. In Test mode the firewall analyzes all traffic per
its configured rulesets, but allows all traffic to flow through the
firewall; heartbeats and syslog messages (if syslog is enabled) are
generated for any violations of the rulesets. In Operational mode
the SA is fully functional, analyzing and blocking network traffic
according to its rulesets. The SA can only enter Operational mode
from Test mode. The firewall is in Decommissioned mode when all
LSMs are deactivated and the SA only listens for commands from
the CMP. The CMP user can apply a transition to Decommissioned
mode only from Passive mode. Fig. 2 depicts the different modes
and the actions to change mode.
Figure 2: Tofino SA Modes
Asset discovery. The term asset refers to any device on the net-
work that receives and/or transmits information, such as a PLC.
Asset discovery occurs once the SA has been discovered and the
Secure Asset Management LSM is activated. By analyzing traffic
flowing across the network, the CMP can identify the type of asset
being used and suggest configuration settings based on pre-defined
asset profiles [4]. The suggested configuration settings can only be
verified or modified by the CMP user.
3.1.3 Security Functions. The supported loadable security modules
and security-related product claims are discussed below.
Event Logger. This LSM records security-relevant events and
alarms generated by the other LSMs in standard syslog format,
Periodic syslog heartbeats are sent to the syslog server to verify
that it is operational. The interval for heartbeats is configurable,
with a default value of 10 seconds.
Firewall. This LSM monitors traffic between the control network
and the protected network, and makes decisions based on a set of
rules. A rule is defined in terms of a source IP address, a destina-
tion IP address, a protocol identifier (i.e., TCP/UDP port number),
a filtering direction (one-way or bidirectional) and a permission
attribute that must be set to one of the following options: Allow,
Allow-Log, Deny, Deny No-Log, or Enforcer. Allow lets traffic pass
through the SAwithout triggering an alarm. Allow-Log also permits
traffic matching the rule to pass through the SA, but an alert will
be generated and logged. Deny blocks the associated traffic and
generates an alert. Deny No-Log blocks the traffic per the rule, but
does not log the event. Enforcer filters traffic based on deep-packet
inspection parameters identified in protocol-specific LSMs.
Modbus TCP Enforcer. This LSM provides deep packet inspec-
tion based on the Modbus function codes and registers in each
Modbus packet. There are three filtering options. Sanity Check
verifies that the Modbus message is properly formed. If an error
is detected, the SA drops the packet and generates an alert. Reset
terminates the TCP connection by sending a TCP-RST packet when
a Modbus packet matching the rule is identified and dropped. The
Exceptions option is similar to Reset, but delivers an exception
message to the HMI instead of sending a TCP-RST.
Secure Assess Management. This LSM keeps track of network
components (e.g., PLC and HMI). After activation, the LSM analyzes
the traffic passed through the SA, generates a list of possible assets,
and reports them to the CMP. The user can selectively add the
assets (displayed on the CMP console) to the network.
Product claims. The product claims of interest are IP spoofing
protection, automatic rule creation, and assisted rule generation.
If automatic rule creation is enabled, the CMP will automatically
create a ruleset based on the protocols supported by the HMI and
the PLC. The user can delete any of the suggested protocols as
needed. Assisted rule generation creates rules based on user input
derived from existing traffic patterns. As packets are sent across
the network, the firewall sends log messages to the CMP. These
messages identify the source, destination, and type of traffic (i.e.,
HTTP, Modbus, ICMP). A knowledgeable administrator would use
the information in these messages to create corresponding rules.
3.1.4 Self-protection Features. The vendor claims to provide secure
communications between the SA and the CMP. While the method
of security is not documented, SSH was observed in Wireshark
packet captures during configuration.
During the SA software update process, the SA drops all packets
that are not part of the communications between the CMP and SA,
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meaning that the PLC and HMI will not be able to send or receive
traffic across the firewall.
3.1.5 Known Vulnerabilities. While there is no CVE specific to
the SA firewall, the SA uses an older version of the open-source
OpenSSH v5 (released in 2008) software1; several CVEs were re-
leased following the publication of OpenSSH v5. These vulnerabili-
ties are mostly specific to the implementation of OpenSSH and not
the SSH protocol itself. For example, CVE-2010-5107 describes a
resource exhaustion vulnerability caused by the use of a fixed time
limit in OpenSSH’s login logic [11] and CVE-2017-15906 explains
a vulnerability in the FTP server used in OpenSSH that allows
creation of zero-length files while in read-only mode [15].
3.2 Tofino Xenon
The Tofino Xenon consists of a hardware base and the following
software: Tofino Configurator, Loadable Firewall LSM, NetConnect
LSM, EtherNet/IP Enforcer LSM, and Modbus TCP Enforcer LSM.
3.2.1 Management Interface. The Tofino Configurator software is
used to manage the Tofino Xenon. The Configurator console shows
configuration information similar to that presented by the SA CMP.
3.2.2 Device Discovery. Similar to the SA, there are two parts to
device discovery, though labeled differently: Tofino discovery and
asset detection.
Tofino discovery. The Xenon supports both continuous and sin-
gle scan operations. Using a borrowed IP address from an asset on
the protected network, both scans operate in the same manner as
the SA’s scan operations.
The Xenon has only three modes of operation. All mode changes
require an explicit user command via the Configurator console.
After a factory reset, the Xenon enters Passive mode. While in this
mode, the Xenon allows all traffic to pass through. From Passive
mode, the Xenon can enter either Test mode or Operational mode.
There is no user command to switch back to Passive mode. Similar
to the SA, while in Test mode, the Xenon examines all traffic per
the current ruleset but does not block any traffic. The Xenon can
transit from Test mode to Operational mode and vice versa. In
Operational mode, all traffic is filtered according to the active rules.
The transitions between Test and Operational are initiated via user
commands. Fig. 3 shows the different modes and the user commands
to change modes.
Asset detection. Asset detection occurs after the Tofino has been
discovered while in the Test mode, and both the Event Logger LSM
and Firewall LSM have been activated [20]. By observing traffic
going across the firewall, the Configurator can compile a list of
assets by their IP addresses and MAC addresses.
3.2.3 Security Functions. The Xenon model we used had five LSMs.
NetConnect. This LSM allows the Configurator to communicate
with the Xenon over the network [20]. Without this LSM, configu-
ration changes can only be applied via a USB device.
Firewall. This LSM enforces packet filtering rules on all traffic
flowing across the Xenon. Each rule is defined as a tuple of a source
1https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.0
Figure 3: Tofino Xenon Modes
IP address, a destination IP address, a TCP/UDP port number, and
a permission attribute. The allowable permissions differ from the
Tofino SA’s permissions; the Configurator only has three options:
Allow, Deny and Enforcer. If Allow is set, the Xenon will let the
packet being examined pass through. Deny blocks the packet and
generates an alert. Enforcer means that the packet will be further
analyzed based on deep-packet inspection parameters identified in
the activated Modbus and EtherNet/IP LSMs.
Event Logger. This LSM generates, stores, and sends event mes-
sages and alerts to either the Configurator acting as a syslog server
or an external syslog server.
Modbus TCP Enforcer. This LSM provides the same Modbus
deep packet inspection functionality available on the SA.
EtherNet/IP Enforcer. This LSM only supports EtherNet/IP ex-
plicit messages. It checks the CIP payload in the EtherNet/IP mes-
sages against the active ruleset. Filtering options include CIP mes-
sage type (e.g., read-only data and read-write data), CIP object class,
per-class CIP service, and vendor-specific objects and services.
Product claims. While IP spoofing protection is not a specific
claim, according to the Configurator User Manual [20], the Firewall
LSM can filter traffic based on both IP and MAC addresses, which
implies packet-spoofing protection.
The Configurator provides suggested firewall rules based on ob-
served network traffic. This flexibility can inadvertently introduce
vulnerabilities, as a novice user can choose to accept all the rules
without fully understanding the associated security ramifications.
3.2.4 Self-protection Features. The Configurator also uses SSH to
securely communicatewith the Xenonwhen applying configuration
changes. The Xenon model we tested uses OpenSSH v6.
The ability to load firewall rules via a USB device can be disabled.
This offline configuration mechanism is intended for use when the
Xenon has no network connectivity to the Configurator. However,
it also allows an unauthorized insider to modify the firewall rules,
especially when there are limited physical access control measures.
Other risky uses of a USB device include 1) downloading for
viewing any of the following: event messages (in syslog format), a
configuration file containing information about the active LSMs,
and a diagnostics file containing the firmware version and hardware
information, and 2) installing software updates.
41
A Strategy for Security Testing Industrial Firewalls ICSS, December 10, 2019, San Juan, PR, USA
3.2.5 KnownVulnerabilities. Older software versions for the Xenon
had several vulnerabilities described in CVE-2017-11400 [12], CVE-
2017-11401 [13], and CVE-2017-11402 [14]. The Xenon used in
this work was automatically updated to the latest software version,
03.2.01, during initial setup, which remediated these vulnerabilities.
4 TEST PHILOSOPHY
The Flaw Hypothesis Methodology begins with a planning phase,
and then consists of four technical stages (Fig. 4): Flaw Generation,
Flaw Confirmation, Flaw Generalization, and Flaw Elimination.
Flaw Generation utilizes experience with flaws in other systems,
the evidence presented for the system under test, and the potential
for the existence of a similar flaw in the target system. Flaw Confir-
mation involves analyses by the penetration testing team as well
as methods to verify each flaw’s existence. These techniques may
involve a combination of examination of code and documentation,
as well as testing. During Flaw Generalization, the examiner con-
siders the underlying factors that may have contributed to the flaw
and hypothesizes similar flaws that may have been introduced else-
where in the system by its developers. Inductive reasoning is used
to generate additional hypotheses. Finally, flaws are eliminated
by the developer. All stages of the methodology involve careful
documentation by the testing team.
The FHM is applicable to white-, gray-, and black-box testing. It
can be used to focus on test cases, in contrast to fuzzing. Use of the
FHM may, but is not required to, reveal vulnerabilities.
Figure 4: Flaw Hypothesis Methodology (from [25])
In this work the FHM provides a framework for black-box testing
of the ICS firewalls described in §3. Our testing is constrained to the
available public interfaces and does not admit binary analysis. The
only documentation available was that made publicly available by
the vendor. Our approach consisted of the following major phases.
(1) Detailed review of vendor documentation, protocols, and
existing related CVEs. In FHM parlance, this corresponds to
Flaw Generation.
(2) Design of tests with an enumeration of expected results. This
and steps 3 and 4 correspond to FHM Flaw Confirmation.
(3) Test execution, which included packet captures and related
evidence, all of which was organized into a test database.
(4) Analysis of test results that compared expected and observed
behaviors. This phase of the effort sometimes resulted in new
test generation and another loop through the process. The
back-end of this phase maps to FHM Flaw Generalization.
The last FHM stage, Flaw Elimination, requires participation of the
SUT’s developers and, hence, is outside the scope of this work.
5 TEST DESIGN
We assumed that 1) the attacker had access to the corporate network,
and that the ICS firewall is between the attacker and the PLC, and
2) the attacker, through observation of network traffic, had gained
an intimate knowledge of the system and processes within.
The test plans for each firewall consist of functional testing, ex-
ception testing, and penetration testing. The objective of functional
testing is to verify vendor claims (IP spoofing protection, Modbus
and EtherNet/IP deep packet inspection, etc.). Exception testing is
conducted to see how the firewalls respond to unusual conditions
(e.g., boundary conditions of Modbus register values and function
codes). Penetration testing uses various Metasploit modules to test
the firewalls’ responses to a variety of exploits.
Each test is defined in terms of its objective, a set of precon-
ditions that must be met before running the tests (e.g., the SA is
in Predeployed mode, following factory reset), the test operation
to be performed (e.g., scan the PLC using Nessus), the expected
results, and, if applicable, special considerations that affect the test
execution (e.g., an SA configuration change test is conducted only
in the configuration phase as the purpose is to observe network
traffic while configuration information is being passed to the SA).
5.1 Approach
For testing purposes, we define three phases of operation: discovery,
configuration, and operational.
The discovery phase, corresponding with the device discovery
functionality described in §3, occurs during initial setup of both
the SA and Xenon. During this phase, the SA and Xenon are in
Predeployed mode and Passive mode, respectively, and thus the ICS
is vulnerable to attack since all network traffic passes through the
firewall unfiltered.
During the configuration phase, the CMP and Configurator pass a
configuration to the firewall. This phase starts when the user applies
a configuration change, and ends when the CMP and Configura-
tor notify the user of a successful or unsuccessful configuration.
Testing this phase is important for two reasons. First, both the
CMP and the Configurator are supposed to pass all configuration
changes securely, as documented [6] [21], and this claim needs to
be verified. Second, the Xenon user manual makes note of a window
of vulnerability during the configuration phase when the Xenon
permits all traffic to flow through it; this was designed to ensure
that the necessary ICS network traffic was not impeded during
configuration [20].
The operational phase takes place when the SA and Xenon are
in Operational mode and they actively enforce their rulesets. This
is the state when the ICS network should be least vulnerable as all
unnecessary ports, protocols, and sources should be blocked.
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Additionally, we conducted special-purpose tests to check if the
firewall under test changes its operating mode via a configuration
load from a USB device as described in the vendor manuals.
5.2 Test Plan
The SA and Xenon tests are summarized in Table 1. (D=discovery;
C=configuration; O=operational; UC=configuration via USB).
Table 1: Summary of Tests
D C O UC Total
SA tests
Functional 4 4 9 5 22
Exception 2 2 2 4 10
Penetration 7 7 7 0 21
Total 13 13 18 9 53
Xenon tests
Functional 4 4 10 4 22
Exception 2 2 2 3 9
Penetration 10 10 10 0 30
Total 16 16 22 7 61
Functional testing. The SA functional tests use open-source
tools (Nessus, Metasploit, and Wireshark) to verify several vendor
claims: IP spoofing protection, support for rule creation, SYN flood
protection, Modbus LSM functionality, EtherNet/IP LSM functional-
ity (Xenon only), and cryptographically-protected communications
between the firewall (SA and Xenon) and the management platform
(CMP and Configurator). The functional test suite also verifies the
claims about mode transitions (e.g., changing from Passive mode
to Test mode) using a USB device while the firewall is configured
to allow mode changes via both a USB device and network access.
Exception testing. This test suite consists of 1) testing the bound-
ary conditions of Modbus commands and register values, and 2)
testing the USB configuration load process for exceptions. The ob-
jective of the boundary tests is to confirm that the firewall responds
to Modbus commands (e.g., FC16 write command and FC03 read
command) with illegal inputs according to the configured Modbus
ruleset. For the USB configuration exception tests, the objective is to
verify that a USB device loaded with a firewall configuration will fail
to load while the firewall is configured to disallow communications
with the CMP via a USB device.
Penetration testing. Penetration testing includes the following
exploits: ARP poisoning, web server stack buffer overflow2, SSHv2
fuzzing, SSH enumerate users, SSH version scanner, SSH key ex-
change DoS, and remote syslog long tag DoS. The Xenon test suite
also includes the following exploits to check for Java-related vul-
nerabilities: Java RMI registry interfaces enumeration, Java RMI
server insecure endpoint code execution scanner, and Java RMI




Our test ICS network uses a Tofino SCADA Security Simulator
(TSSS) to provide a simulated natural gas compressor system, which
consists of the following: Wago PLC (750-841 series), Tofino HMI
software, CMP and Configurator software, and demo panel (Fig. 5).
Figure 5: TSSS layout from left to right: Tofino Xenon, demo
panel with mounted Tofino SA andWago PLC, Netgear Hub,
monitor of the PC showing the user interface presented by
the HMI and the CMP/Configurator interface.
While the tank level is controlled from the HMI, the compressor
speed is controlled locally on the demo panel. The demo panel
provides a visual representation of the tank level with LEDs that
indicate a level increase or decrease. The tank has three vertically
aligned LEDs (red, amber, and green) that represent the level of the
tank. The two red buttons labeled UP and DOWN, on the lower
right of the panel are used to control the compressor speed.
In subsequent phases of our project, an ICS network that employs
model-identical components of a shipboard control system will be
used instead of the TSSS.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
6.1 Test Environment
The test environment consists of the simulated ICS network, a
Windows 7 desktop, a Windows 7 laptop, and a Kali Linux laptop
(Fig. 6).
Figure 6: Test environment.
TheWindows desktop hosts two virtual machines (VM); one VM
runs the Tofino HMI software and the other VM runs the CMP and
Configurator software (one at a time). The Windows laptop (on the
left of the Tofino demo panel) is used to capture traffic between
the HMI/CMP/Configurator and the firewall. The Kali Linux laptop
(to the right of the Tofino demo panel) is used to run Nessus and
Metasploit. In addition to the Netgear hub, an Ethernet tap (network
sniffer) is used to capture traffic between the firewall and the PLC.
Kali Linux (version 3.28.2) was dual-booted onto a Dell Latitude
(E64230) laptop running Windows 7. Kali Linux comes pre-loaded
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with the Metasploit framework, so no additional installation was
needed for Metasploit. Nessus is not pre-loaded on Kali Linux and
had to be installed separately. To ensure the same scan was con-
ducted for each test, we created a user-defined scan policy using the
basic network scan template. The scanners defined in this template
perform a comprehensive scan of the network, to include all Nessus
plugins and all ports.
The Modbus/TCP Device Identification module used in the Nes-
sus scans sends an “Encapsulated Interface Transport” read request,
and a PLC that supports that request would return vendor infor-
mation such as vendor name, product code, and major and minor
revision. However, theWago PLC does not support this read request,
and returns invalid arguments for the request.
6.2 SA Test Results
A test is considered to be passed when the observed test results
match the expected test results. Conversely, a failed test means the
observed and expected results do not match. A failed test does not
necessarily indicate a vulnerability; in some cases, it only suggests
that further investigation is needed.
The SA test results are summarized in Table 2 (P=Passed; F=Failed).
The overall passing rate is 72% (total number of test cases is 53).
The passing rates of the functional, exception, and penetration test
cases are 59%, 90%, and 76%, respectively. The SA failed tests are
summarized in Table 3.
Table 2: SA Test Results
Functional Exception Penetration Total
Discovery P=3; F=1 P=2; F=0 P=6; F=1 P=11; F=2
Configuration P=3; F=1 P=2; F=0 P=5; F=2 P=10; F=3
Operation P=7; F=2 P=2; F=0 P=5; F=2 P=14; F=4









SA functional testing. Seven Nessus scans were conducted for
the SA functional tests. Nessus was configured to scan the IP address
of the PLC with all available plugins enabled, and to test a port
range of 0-65535. Six scans completed as expected. The scan that
used a spoofed IP address (the HMI’s IP address instead of the Kali
Linux system’s IP address) did not perform as expected; it was
blocked by the Modbus TCP LSM, not the Firewall LSM. However,
we observed that when both IP address and MAC address were
spoofed, the corresponding scan was blocked by the Firewall LSM
as expected.
All three SYN flood protection tests performed better than ex-
pected. These tests, which were separately run in each of the three
testing phases, used the Metasploit TCP SYN Flooder module3 to
send a large number of TCP SYN messages to the PLC. Metasploit
was configured to transmit ARP packets with a source MAC ad-
dress of 00:00:00:00:00:00, requesting the identity of the PLC. In
the discovery phase, we expected that the SA would allow all traf-
fic to pass through because the SA was in Predeployed mode. We
3https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/dos/tcp/synflood
observed that SA dropped the ARP packets and the exploit was
unsuccessful. The SA supports three pre-defined PPS rates (10, 50,
and 100 packets per second), and for the SYN flood tests in the
configuration and operational phases, the PPS rate was set to 10.
The results of these tests showed that instead of limiting the ARP
packets according to the PPS rate, the SA discarded all ARP packets,
i.e., the PCAP behind the firewall showed that no ARP with source
MAC address of 00:00:00:00:00:00 passed through the firewall.
For the USB configuration loading tests, the SA was configured
to allow the SA’s configuration to be loaded from a USB device
and via network access. Five tests were executed and the observed
results were inconclusive, possibly caused by documentation errors.
We plan to further investigate the observed behavior.
SA exception testing. There were six Modbus TCP LSM excep-
tion tests and four USB configuration loading exception tests. The
LSM exception tests used the Metasploit ModbusClient module4 to
send Modbus FC16 write commands and FC03 read commands with
inputs that exceed the register values permitted by the Modbus pro-
tocol [10]. The range of possible Modbus registers is 0–49999 and
the allowable register range specified in the Modbus LSM ruleset
was 12288–12387. The register values used in the exception tests
were 0, 12287, 12388, 49999, and 50000. The observed results of
all six tests confirmed the expected behavior; the SA allowed the
read and write commands in the discovery phase and blocked those
commands in the configuration and operational phases.
Three USB loading exception tests were performed with the SA
configured to only allow configuration loading via network access.
These tests passed, i.e., the SA did not permit a configuration change
via a USB device when the communications mode between the CMP
and itself was “network only”. The fourth USB loading test did not
perform as expected. This test was to verify that, according to the
SA manual [4], a mode change from Passive to Operational would
not be allowed . Before running this test, the SA was placed in the
Passive mode, the communications mode was changed to “both
USB and network”, and the SA mode in the configuration stored in
the USB device was set to Operational mode. After a successful USB
load, the SA operated as though it had transitioned into Operational
mode.
SA penetration testing. There are six groups of tests; each group
uses a different Metasploit module and consists of three tests cases
that correspond to the three testing phases (Table 4).
All tests in groups 2–6 completed as expected. Group 1 tests tried
to poison the ARP caches in the VM running the CMP. The ARP
poisoning attempt during the discovery phase was, as expected,
successful, i.e., the ARP table of the CMP VM was updated with the
spoofed IP address andMAC address because the Secure Assess LSM
was not activated. For the configuration and operational phases,
the Secure Assess LSM was activated and, thus, we expected the
CMP to report a new asset with the spoofed IP and MAC addresses
and the ARP table of the CMP VM to be updated with the spoofed
addresses. However, we observed otherwise; the CMP did not report
any new asset and the ARP table was not poisoned.
The objective of the Group 7 tests shown in Table 4 is to de-
termine how the SA and the syslog daemon running on the CMP
4https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbusclient
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Table 3: Summary of SA Failed Tests
Test Expected Observed
Functional testing
Discovery SYN flood (in Pasive mode) SA allows all traffic SA blocked exploit
Configuration SYN flood with PPS rate of 10 SA enforces PPS rate limit SA blocked exploit
Operation 1. Address spoofing – IP Only 1. SA blocks Nessus scan per Firewall ruleset 1. SA blocked scan per Modbus ruleset2. SYN flood with PPS rate of 10 2. SA enforces PPS rate limit 2. SA blocked exploit
USB Config.
1. Mode Change via USB, P→T 1. Successful mode change 1. Unsuccessful mode change
2. Mode Change via USB, T→O 2. Successful mode change 2. Unsuccessful mode change
3. Mode Change via USB, T→P 3. Successful mode change 3. Unsuccessful mode change
4. Mode Change via USB, O→P 4. Successful mode change 4. Unsuccessful mode change
5. Mode Change via USB, O→T 5. Successful mode change 5. Unsuccessful mode change
Exception testing
USB Config. Mode Change via USB, P→O SA denies requested mode change SA transitioned from P to O
Penetration testing
Discovery Rsyslog malformed tag DoS SA allows msg to PLC; CMP accepts msg SA allowed msg to PLC; CMP rejected msg
Configuration 1. Rsyslog malformed tag DoS 1. SA blocks msg to PLC; CMP accepts msg 1. SA blocked msg to PLC; CMP rejected msg2. ARP poisoning 2. Asset inventory is updated with spoofed assets;
ARP table is poisoned
2. Asset inventory was not updated; ARP table
was not poisoned
Operation 1. Rsyslog malformed tag DoS 1. Same as Configuration, Test 1 above 1. Same as Configuration, Test 1 above2. ARP poisoning 2. Same as Configuration, Test 2 above 2. Same as Configuration, Test 2 above
Modes: P=Passive; T=Test; O=Operational
Table 4: SA Penetration Tests
Grp Exploit Metasploit Module Target









3 SSH Version 2 fuzzing auxiliary/fuzzers/
ssh_version_2
SA
4 SSH user enumeration auxiliary/scanner/ssh/
ssh_enumusers
SA
5 SSH version scanning auxiliary/scanner/ssh/
ssh_version
SA










respond to a malformed syslog injection sent by a Metasploit mod-
ule and designed to shutdown a remote syslog daemon. In all three
phases, we expected the exploit to have no effect on the SA and that
the CMP (acting as the syslog server) would accept and store the
malformed syslog message. For the discovery phase, the observed
results showed that Metasploit could send a syslog message to the
PLC but the PLC responded with an ICMP destination unreachable
message. Metasploit was also able to send a syslog message to the
CMP but the CMP syslog daemon rejected that message. For the
configuration and operational phases, the CMP syslog daemon also
rejected the malformed syslog message. The SA, on the other hand,
blocked the malformed syslog message sent to the PLC.
6.3 Xenon Test Results
Most of the Xenon tests are similar to the SA tests except for the
EtherNet/IP LSM tests; the SA does not support EtherNet/IP. The
Xenon test results are summarized in Table 5. With 61 tests, the
overall passing rate is 85%. The passing rates of the functional, ex-
ception, and penetration tests are 82%, 100%, and 85%, respectively.
Table 5: Xenon Test Results
Functional Exception Penetration Total
Discovery P=3; F=1 P=2; F=0 P=9; F=1 P=14; F=2
Configuration P=3; F=1 P=2; F=0 P=8; F=2 P=13; F=3
Operation P=8; F=2 P=2; F=0 P=8; F=2 P=18; F=4









Xenon functional testing. We used the same Nessus scans on
the Xenon. Five of the six tests performed as expected. Although
we did not find any claim about IP spoofing protection in the Xenon
manual [20], we ran the same IP spoofing test against the Xenon.
The Xenon results were different than the SA results; the scan was
not blocked. However, the same scan was blocked when both IP
and MAC addresses were spoofed, as observed in the same SA test.
The SYN flood protection and the Modbus TCP LSM read and
write tests yielded the same results as observed in similar SA tests.
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To test the EtherNet/IP (ENIP) LSM, we used the Metasploit ENIP
“multi-CIP commands” module5 to send multiple CIP commands
to try to stop and possibly crash an ENIP PLC. The Firewall LSM
was configured to allow port 44818 (a TCP port commonly used for
ENIP) and the ENIP LSM was configured to allow both read and
write CIP messages. The EtherNet/IP tests performed as expected;
the SYN packet to establish an ENIP connection got to the PLC
but, since the Wago PLC does not support ENIP, it terminated the
connection request with a TCP RST packet.
Four USB configuration loading tests were executed with the
Xenon configured to allow configuration changes via both an USB
device and network access. The tests completed as expected, i.e.,
the configuration stored in the USB was loaded and a syslog mes-
sage was generated, reporting a mode transition from the current
operating mode to the mode specified in the loaded configuration.
Xenon exception testing. The same six Modbus TCP LSM tests
used in the SA exception testing were executed against the Xenon.
As expected, the Xenon allowed the Modbus read and write com-
mands in the discovery and configuration phases, and blocked those
commands in the operational phase. No ENIP exception testing was
done because no ENIP connection could be established due the
PLC’s lack of ENIP support.
For the three USB loading exception tests, the Xenon also be-
haved as expected. The Xenon was configured to only allow con-
figuration changes via network access, and the three attempts to
load from an USB device were denied.
Xenon penetration testing. The Xenon penetration testing in-
cluded the same seven groups of penetration tests used against the
SA (Table 4) and three additional groups of RMI tests (see Table 6).
Table 6: Xenon Penetration Tests
Grp Exploit Metasploit Module Target
1—7 Same exploits used for
SA tests. See Table 4.
Same Metasploit mod-















10 Java RMI server inse-
cure default configura-





The results of Groups 1–7 tests were similar to the results of
Groups 1–7 tests for the SA. See §5.2 for more details on these
tests. Groups 8–10 tests completed as expected. In the discovery
and configuration phases, the Xenon did not block the TCP SYN
packet with the destination port 1099 (RMI port) but the exploit
did not proceed due to the TCP RST response from the PLC. In the
operational phase, the Xenon blocked the exploit and generated a
syslog message for violation of the Firewall LSM ruleset.
The Xenon failed tests are summarized in Table 7.
5https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/admin/scada/multi_cip_command
6.4 Discussion
While our testing did not uncover any major vulnerabilities or
shortcomings of either the SA or the Xenon, we found that the
vendor claim of IP spoofing protection is misleading. From the
vendor manuals, we assumed that this functionality would work
when only the IP address was spoofed. From the test results, it
appears that this functionality only works if both IP and MAC
addresses are spoofed. Another discrepancy concerns the ability
to configure the firewall via a USB device. On the Tofino SA, this
capability does not perform as expected when changing modes.
The observed behaviors need further investigation.
Our tests did not identify any undocumented vulnerabilities.
Undocumented is an important distinction, because the Tofino
Xenon has a documented window of vulnerability while it is being
configured during which it permits all traffic to pass. Thus, while
this behavior is a vulnerability in the firewall, it is documented in
the Xenon user manual. Employing dual firewalls and only updating
one firewall at a time may mitigate this threat.
The NIST Special Publication 800-115 (Technical Guide to In-
formation Security Testing and Assessment) [19], which does not
reference the FHM, describes four phases for penetration testing.
• In the planning phase, testing goals and rules are defined and
agreed to by all stakeholders.
• The discovery phase has two parts. The first involves informa-
tion gathering and identifying potential targets; the second
requires testers to use their own experience of vulnerability
analysis and information in existing vulnerability databases
to hypothesize potential vulnerabilities in the SUT.
• In the attack phase, the testers try to exploit the hypothe-
sized vulnerabilities. Mitigations for successful exploits are
identified. The resulting lessons learned are added to the
body of knowledge and the testing process loops back at the
discovery phase.
• Reporting occurs in tandem with the other three phases. The
testers report the results of each phase to management.
Although the NIST phases do not map precisely to the FHM,
one can draw parallels between the discovery phase and FHM Flaw
Generation, and between the attack phase and the other three FHM
stages (Flaw Confirmation, Flaw Generalization, and Flaw Elimina-
tion). Both methodologies rely on planning and documentation.
The NIST methodology involves considerably more administra-
tive paperwork, which is not necessary for a small research team.
This made the FHM more attractive. In addition, the FHM has been
successfully applied to the evaluation of commercial products and
is well suited to our assessment of a single target under laboratory
conditions. [9]
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we describe a blackbox testing approach to test the
hypothesis that some ICS firewalls do not always provide the func-
tionality described by their vendors and are vulnerable to open
source exploits. Our testing strategy was based on the Flaw Hy-
pothesis Methodology. Using two commercial industrial firewalls,
Tofino SA and Tofino Xenon, and open source tools, we performed
a series of functional and exception tests to determine whether the
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Table 7: Summary of Xenon Failed Tests
Test Expected Observed
Functional testing
Discovery SYN flood (in Passive mode) Xenon allows all traffic Xenon blocked exploit
Configuration SYN flood with PPS rate of 10 Xenon enforces PPS rate limit Xenon blocked exploit
Operation 1. Address spoofing – IP Only 1. Xenon blocks Nessus scan per Modbus ruleset 1. Xenon did not block scan2. SYN flood with PPS rate of 10 2. Xenon enforces PPS limit 2. Xenon blocked exploit
Penetration testing
Discovery Rsyslog malformed tag DoS Xenon allows message to PLC; Configurator ac-
cepts message
Xenon allowed message to PLC; Xenon blocked
message to Configurator
Configuration 1. Rsyslog malformed tag DoS 1. Xenon blocks message to PLC; Configuratoraccepts message
1. Xenon allowed message to PLC; Xenon blocked
message to Configurator
2. ARP poisoning 2. Asset inventory is updated with spoofed assets;
ARP table is poisoned
2. Asset inventory was not updated; ARP table
was not poisoned
Operation 1. Rsyslog malformed tag DoS 1. Same as Configuration, Test 1 above 1. Xenon blocked message to PLC; Xenon blockedmessage to Configurator
2. ARP poisoning 2. Same as Configuration, Test 2 above 2. Same as Configuration, Test 2 above
two firewalls provide the functionality described in their user doc-
umentation. We also ran a suite of penetration tests to determine if
the firewalls are susceptible to known exploits.
While our tests did not reveal any major issues with the vendor
claims, the test results indicated that the vendor claim of IP spoofing
protection only worked when both IP and MAC addresses were
spoofed. For the SA, we also observed that changing mode via a
USB device did not behave as expected when the firewall was in
Test mode. For the Xenon, the EtherNet/IP LSM’s functionality was
not fully examined because the PLC used in our test environment
does not support ENIP. We plan to replace the current PLC with one
that natively supports ENIP such as the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell
Automation ControlLogix [1].
We also plan to expand the testing scope to include additional
ICS firewalls such as the Stratix 5950 Security Appliance [2] as
well as ENIP fuzz testing. The Stratix 5950 uses the Cisco Adaptive
Security Appliance firewall technology, which has been known to
be susceptible to common exploits such as unauthenticated input
and certificate validation [23].
Further future work can explore the robustness of the firewalls
in terms of exploit mitigation and patch management.
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